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Dog Sniffs, Technology, and the Mythical
Constitutional Right to Criminal Privacy
by KENNETH J. MELILLI*
Suppose the government was capable of detecting criminal
conduct by some method or device that would not reveal any
information concerning lawful items or activities. Could the
acquisition of such information under these circumstances constitute
an "unreasonable search" under the Fourth Amendment?'
This scenario is not merely hypothetical. The most prominent
reality in which this question arises involves specially trained dogs,
which, using their superior sense of smell, can alert to the presence of
illegal drugs.2 Most dramatically, suppose that such a specially
trained dog ("drug dog"), from a location outside a home, alerts to
the presence of illegal drugs inside that home. Assuming that the
physical location of the dog at the time of the sniff is not itself an
intrusion into a valid privacy interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment, the question is whether the sniff itself constitutes a
"search" under the Fourth Amendment. In this Article, I suggest that
the answer is no-i.e., that the sniff itself is not a "search" under the
Fourth Amendment. I also suggest that the considerable opinions
and authorities to the contrary are all premised upon a failure to
begin the analysis with the Fourth Amendment itself.
I. A Little History
The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
* Kenneth J. Melilli, Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law.
Thanks to Nathan Dallon, Pam Flint and Pat Andersen for their assistance.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2. Ric Simmons, The Two Unanswered Questions of Illinois v. Caballes: How to
Make the World Safe for Binary Searches, 80 TUL. L. REV. 411, 413 (2005).
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unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized.3
Even as constitutional provisions go, the Fourth Amendment is
particularly indefinite. It does not regulate all governmental
encroachments into our privacy, only those that meet the unspecified
definitions of "searches" or "seizures." Neither does it proscribe all
searches and seizures, only those that are "unreasonable." Moreover,
while the Fourth Amendment clearly requires probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant, it does not tell us when, if ever, a warrant is
required. Finally, it does not tell us what prerequisites, if any, are
required for a search or seizure conducted without a warrant.
Consequently, when the United States Supreme Court has been
called upon-as it often has-to determine exactly what the text of
the Fourth Amendment means, the answers have been anything but
obvious. In order to supply the Fourth Amendment with any
substance, the Court has had to fashion rules that, while consistent
with the spirit and intent of the provision, are by no means the
exclusive inference to be derived from its text.
For example, at one time the Court insisted that a search or
seizure could only be conducted with probable cause and a warrant,
subject only to a few exceptions.! However, as sensible such a rule
might be as a matter of policy, it is hardly mandated by the text of the
Fourth Amendment. Moreover, the so-called "exceptions" have
proven to be so numerous and so extensive that the circumstances in
which a warrant, and sometimes also probable cause, is not required
can hardly be characterized as exceptional.! More recently, the Court
has disavowed the presumption that the Fourth Amendment requires
3. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
4. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S.
493, 497-98 (1958).
5. 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE § 10.01[c], at 163 (5th ed. 2010). For example, warrants are not required for
arrests outside the home (Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980)), searches of motor
vehicles (California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)), or inventory searches (Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987)). Neither warrants nor probable cause are required for,
among other circumstances, searches incident to arrest (Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752
(1969)), stop-and-frisks (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)), or searches of students or their
property by public school officials (New Jersey v. T L. 0., 469 U.S. 325 (1985)).
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warrants, instead focusing upon the specified test of reasonableness.
To the extent that searches often require warrants based upon
probable cause, that result is simply the consequence of balancing the
individual's legitimate expectations of privacy against the state's
legitimate interest in crime detection and prevention.'
Even more importantly for our purposes, in the early years,
focusing upon the "right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects," the Court restricted the perimeters of the
Fourth Amendment to physical trespasses upon one's person, house,
papers, or effects.' Invasions of privacy that did not involve a trespass
upon one of these four sanctuaries were beyond the scope of the
Fourth Amendment.0
However, in 1967, the Court decided Katz v. United States," and
in so doing, enlarged the scope of the term, "search," to which the
prerequisites of the Fourth Amendment apply. With the test of time,
Katz has been understood to stand for the proposition, articulated by
Justice John Marshall Harlan II in his concurring opinion that, for a
search to take place, "there is a twofold requirement, first that a
person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to
recognize as 'reasonable."" 2 Today, then, a governmental intrusion
into the privacy of a citizen is not a "search" unless it either involves a
physical intrusion upon persons, houses, papers, or effects, or involves
an intrusion upon an actual and reasonable expectation of privacy.
As applied to dog sniffs, the interesting question should always
arise only in connection with the Katz prong of the test. If the police
enter a home or a motor vehicle with a drug dog that, once inside,
alerts to illegal drugs, there is no question that a search has taken
place by virtue of the physical intrusion of the police and dog into the
home or vehicle. However, when the drug dog sniffs without
physically intruding upon persons, houses, papers, or effects, the
6. 1 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 5, § 10.01[c), at 163.
7. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991).
8. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (citing Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979)); T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 340.
9. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 464 (1928).
10. Id. at 466.
11. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12. Id. at 361.
13. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414 (2013); United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct.
945, 949-50 (2012).
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result is not so obvious. If this is a search, it can only be so because
the criminal defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy.
With this backdrop, how has the Court handled the question of
whether sniffs by drug dogs constitute searches under the Fourth
Amendment? In United States v. Place, the Court was presented with
the "issue whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits law enforcement
authorities from temporarily detaining personal luggage for exposure
to a trained narcotics detection dog on the basis of reasonable
suspicion that the luggage contains narcotics." 4 The Court ultimately
determined that property, like persons, can be constitutionally
detained briefly on the basis of reasonable suspicion." However,
because the detention of the luggage was too lengthy and otherwise
too burdensome to fall within this rule, and because the police lacked
the probable cause required for the full-blown seizure that actually
occurred, any evidence discovered as a result of the detention of the
luggage was the product of an illegal seizure.16
While the question of the admissibility of the evidence found
within the luggage was, thus, fully resolved without the necessity of
addressing any other legal issue, the Court did seize the opportunity
to address the question of whether the dog sniff constitutes a search.
To that end, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, writing for a six-member
majority, concluded that it did not, offering the follow analysis:
A "canine sniff" by a well-trained narcotics detection
dog, however, does not require opening the luggage.
It does not expose noncontraband items that otherwise
would remain hidden from public view, as does, for
example, an officer's rummaging through the contents
of the luggage. Thus, the manner in which information
is obtained through this investigative technique is
much less intrusive than a typical search. Moreover,
the sniff discloses only the presence or absence of
narcotics, a contraband item. Thus, despite the fact
that the sniff tells the authorities something about the
contents of the luggage, the information obtained is
14. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 697-98 (1983). The significance of the term
"reasonable suspicion" is that, while probable cause is required for a full-blown search or
seizure, only reasonable suspicion-a lesser quantum of evidence-is required for a brief
investigatory detention of a person (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)), or of property
(Place, 462 U.S. at 697-98).
15. Place, 462 U.S. at 706.
16. Id. at 709.
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limited. This limited disclosure also ensures that the
owner of the property is not subjected to . . .
embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less
discriminate and more intrusive investigative methods.
In these respects, the canine sniff is sui generis.
We are aware of no other investigative procedure that
is so limited both in the manner in which the
information is obtained and in the content of the
information revealed by the procedure. Therefore, we
conclude that the particular course of investigation
that the agents intended to pursue here-exposure of
respondent's luggage, which was located in a public
place, to a trained canine-did not constitute a
"search" within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment."
In her smorgasbord of rationales for the Court's conclusion that
a dog sniff is not a search, Justice O'Connor provided a less-than-
excellent explanation of why the process falls outside the governing
tests. Certainly the fact that "[a] 'canine sniff' by a well-trained
narcotics detection dog ... does not require opening the luggage"
takes the process outside the trespass prong.18  As will be
demonstrated, the fact that "the sniff discloses only the presence or
absence of narcotics, a contraband item" is critical to the issue of
whether the defendant possesses a reasonable expectation of privacy,
but Justice O'Connor made no attempt to explain why this is so.'9
Citation to factual irrelevances, such as the dog sniff being "much less
intrusive than a typical search," it "ensur[ing] that the owner of the
property is not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience,"
and it being "sui generis" simply muddied the inquiry, as none of
these appear to have any relationship to either the Katz test or the
Fourth Amendment. 20
In two separate opinions concurring in the judgment, three
Justices chastised the Court for addressing an issue not briefed by the
parties, not presented to the lower courts, and not necessary for the
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judgment." Justices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall
specifically likened dog sniffs to recognized "searches" accomplished
by "certain electronic detection devices" because each "adds a new
and previously unobtainable dimension to human perception," thus
"represent[ing] a greater intrusion into an individual's privacy."22
The next year, in United States v. Jacobsen,2 having determined
that federal agents had lawfully seized bags of white powder
discovered by employees of a private carrier, the Court turned to the
question of whether a chemical field test performed upon the white
powder to determine that it was cocaine was in fact a search.24 Citing
Place as dictating the conclusion that such a procedure is not a search,
the Court, per Justice John Paul Stevens, explained its conclusion:
The field test at issue could disclose only one fact
previously unknown to the agent-whether or not a
suspicious white powder was cocaine. It could tell him
nothing more, not even whether the substance was
sugar or talcum powder.
A chemical test that merely discloses whether or
not a particular substance is cocaine does not
compromise any legitimate interest in privacy....
[E]ven if the results are negative-merely disclosing
that the substance is something other than cocaine-
such a result reveals nothing of special interest.
Congress has decided-and there is no question about
its power to do so-to treat the interest in "privately"
possessing cocaine as illegitimate; thus governmental
conduct that can reveal whether a substance is cocaine,
and no other arguably "private" fact, compromises no
legitimate privacy interest.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, took issue with the
Court's resolution of this question, insisting instead that the Court has
21. Id. at 711 (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 719-20.
23. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984).
24. Id. at 122.
25. Id. at 122-23.
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"always looked to the context in which an item is concealed, not to
the identity of the concealed item."26
What is most startling about the Court's
interpretation of the term "search," both in this case
and in Place, is its exclusive focus on the nature of the
information or item sought and revealed through the
use of a surveillance technique, rather than on the
context in which the information or item is concealed.
Combining this approach with the blanket assumption,
implicit in Place and explicit in this case, that
individuals in our society have no reasonable
expectation of privacy in the fact that they have
contraband in their possession, the Court adopts a
general rule that a surveillance technique does not
constitute a search if it reveals only whether or not an
individual possesses contraband.
[I]f a device were developed that, when aimed at a
person, would detect instantaneously whether the
person is carrying cocaine, there would be no Fourth
Amendment bar, under the Court's approach, to the
police setting up such a device on a street corner and
scanning all passersby. In fact, the Court's analysis is
so unbounded that if a device were developed that
could detect, from the outside of a building, the
presence of cocaine inside, there would be no
constitutional obstacle to the police cruising through a
residential neighborhood and using the device to
identify all homes in which the drug is present....
Fortunately, . . . this Court ultimately stands ready to
prevent this Orwellian world from coming to pass.27
From a certain perspective, Justice Brennan was prescient in his
anticipation. After he departed from the Court, the Court in 2001
was faced with "the question whether the use of a thermal-imaging
device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative
amounts of heat within the home constitutes a 'search' within the
26. Id. at 139 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 137-38.
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meaning of the Fourth Amendment." 28 The five-Justice majority in
Kyllo v. United States concluded that where "the Government uses a
device that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home
that would previously have been unknowable without physical
intrusion, the surveillance is a 'search.' 2
The Kyllo opinion contains some broad language. In rejecting
the Government's contention that thermal imaging is not a search
because it does not detect intimate or private information, the Court
noted that the "Fourth Amendment's protection of the home has
never been tied to measurement of the quality or quantity of
information obtained,"30 that "[i]n the home,... all details are
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying
government eyes,"" and that "obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home ...
constitutes a search."32
Among other objections, the four dissenting Justices quarreled
with the perceived overbreadth of the majority's language:
It is clear, however, that the category of "sense-
enhancing technology" covered by the new rule is far
too broad. It would, for example, embrace potential
mechanical substitutes for dogs trained to react when
they sniff narcotics. But in United States v. Place,....
we held that a dog sniff that "discloses only the
presence or absence of narcotics" does "not constitute
a 'search' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment," and it must follow that sense-enhancing
equipment that identifies nothing but illegal activity is
not a search either....
The application of the Court's new rule to "any
information regarding the interior of the home" is also
unnecessarily broad. If it takes sensitive equipment to
detect an odor that identifies criminal conduct and
nothing else, the fact that the odor emanates from the
28. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 29 (2001).
29. Id. at 40.
30. Id. at 37.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 34.
interior of a home should not provide it with
constitutional protection.33
Was the distress exhibited by the dissenters warranted? Did the
majority in Kyllo truly intend to threaten the principal discussed in
Place that processes that detect only criminal conduct cannot
constitute a search? That is a most unlikely possibility. The Court's
majority opinion in Kyllo references neither Place nor Jacobsen-an
unimaginable oversight if the Kyllo Court intended to disturb the
principle announced in Place and applied in Jacobsen. Moreover, the
Kyllo majority made very clear that it did not view the thermal
imaging device as fitting the paradigm of a process that "identifies
criminal conduct and nothing else."' In Kyllo, the Court specifically
pointed out that the thermal imager "might disclose, for example, at
what hour each night the lady of the house takes her daily sauna and
bath" or "that someone left a closet light on."
Notwithstanding whatever doubts Kyllo raised concerning the
Place/Jacobsen rule, that principle was reenergized in Illinois v.
Caballes.36 There, the Court considered "[w]hether the Fourth
Amendment requires reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify using
a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle during a legitimate traffic
stop." 7 The Court accepted as uncontested that the traffic stop was
justified at its inception and that the duration of the stop was not at
all extended by the dog sniffing the defendant's car while the
defendant was otherwise detained for the traffic violation.
As to the dog sniff that occurred during that lawful traffic stop,
the Court concluded that no "search," as that term of art is used
under the Fourth Amendment, occurred.39 No search takes place
absent an interference with a legitimate expectation of privacy.40
And, any expectation of privacy in contraband is not legitimate.4'
33. Id. at 47-48 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 48.
35. Id. at 38 (majority opinion).
36. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405 (2005).
37. Id. at 407.
38. Id. at 420-21.
39. Id. at 410.
40. Id. at 408.
41. Id. As the Court stated, "[tjhe legitimate expectation that information about
perfectly lawful activity will remain private is categorically distinguishable from
respondent's hopes or expectations concerning the nondetection of contraband...." Id.
at 410. "[A]ny interest in possessing contraband cannot be deemed 'legitimate."' Id. at 408.
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Society simply does not regard as legitimate a hope or expectation
that criminal conduct will go undetected.42 Consequently, a "dog sniff
conducted during a concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no
information other than the location of a substance that no individual
has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment."43
Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg authored
separate dissenting opinions. Justice Souter argued that the
conclusion that dog sniffs are not searches because they can only
detect illegal drugs is premised upon "the assumption that trained
sniffing dogs do not err."" Citing evidence that drug dogs sometimes
return false positives, Justice Souter concluded that:
Once the dog's fallibility is recognized, ... that
ends the justification claimed in Place for treating the
sniff as sui generis under the Fourth Amendment: the
sniff alert does not necessarily signal hidden
contraband, and opening the container or enclosed
space whose emanations the dog has sensed will not
necessarily reveal contraband or any other evidence of
crime.45
For Justice Souter, then, the dog sniff is no less a search than the
thermal-imaging device addressed in Kyllo.
Unpersuaded, the Court's majority announced that its
"conclusion is entirely consistent" with the decision in Kyllo."
"Critical to [the Kyllo] decision was the fact that the device was
capable of detecting lawful activity. . . ."4' By contrast, even an
''erroneous alert" by a drug dog does not reveal "any legitimate
private information." 48
Scholarly reaction to Caballes has been generally critical, and
sometimes vitriolic. It has been deemed "a deeply problematic and
dangerous intrusion into American civil liberties" 49 and a threat to a
42. Id. at 408-09.
43. Id. at 410.
44. Id. at 410 (Souter, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 412-13.
46. Id. at 409 (majority opinion).
47. Id. at 409-10.
48. Id. at 409.
49. Cecil C. Hunt, II, Calling in the Dogs: Suspicionless Sniff Searches and
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 285, 286 (2005).
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"free society."o The Place/Jacobsen/Caballes conclusion that there is
no legitimate interest in privacy for contraband has been
mischaracterized as an exception to the Fourth Amendment." It has
been attacked as doing violence to the Fourth Amendment by
focusing upon the item sought rather than upon the place searched;52
the alleged consequence is that a search is ultimately justified, not
prospectively, but retrospectively by the eventual recovery of
contraband."
Forced to retreat by Caballes, its critics have entrenched at the
doors to their homes. Because of the exalted status of the home in
the hierarchy of private places, several commentators have suggested
that, even if dog sniffs of luggage in public areas (Place) and dog
sniffs of motor vehicles (Caballes) are not searches, dog sniffs to
discover the contents of homes are surely Fourth Amendment
searches.54 One commentator has analogized dog sniffs of homes to
Nazi Germany."
Assuming that the dog's location at the point of the sniff is not
itself an invasion into a Fourth Amendment sanctuary, several courts
confronted with the issue have concluded that the fact that the sniff
detects drugs inside a home does not render the process a search
under the Fourth Amendment." In other words, the rationale that
there is no legitimate expectation of privacy for contraband allows no
exception for contraband in the home. Other courts, however, have
reasoned that the sacrosanctity of the home mandates the conclusion
that a dog sniff disclosing the presence of contraband in a home is, in
50. Renee Swanson, Are We Safe at Home from the Prying Dog Sniff?, 11 LOY. J.
PUB. INT. L. 131, 156 (2009).
51. Timothy C. MacDonnell, Orwellian Ramifications: The Contraband Exception to
the Fourth Amendment, 41 U. MEM. L. REV. 299, 302 (2010).
52. Swanson, supra note 50, at 150-51; Hunt, supra note 49, at 296-99.
53. Michael Mayer, Keep Your Nose Out of My Business - A look at Dog Sniffs in
Public Places Versus the Home, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1031, 1038-39 (2012); Hunt, supra
note 49, at 331-32.
54. Mayer, supra note 53, at 1037, 1039-40, 1054-56; Jared Willis, Place Doesn't
Apply to My Place; The California Home Is Sui Generis Because Medical Marijuana Is Not
Contraband and Indiscriminate Residential Dog Sniffs Invade a Patient's Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy, 39 W. ST. U. L. REV. 187, 200 (2012); Mark E. Smith, Going to the
Dogs: Evaluating the Proper Standard for Narcotic Detector Dog Searches of Private
Residences, 46 HOUs. L. REV. 103, 137 (2009).
55. Willis, supra note 54, at 200.
56. E.g., United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1016 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v.
Brock, 417 F.3d 692,695-97 (7th Cir. 2005); People v. Jones, 755 N.W.2d 224,229 (Mich. 2008).
57. Scott, 610 F.3d at 1016; Jones, 755 N.W.2d at 229.
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fact, a search." There appeared to be every indication that the
Supreme Court would settle the matter when it granted certiorari in
the case of Florida v. Jardines." However, the Court's decision in that
case still leaves the matter unresolved.
In Jardines, police officers, accompanied by a drug dog, entered
upon the front porch of the defendant's home for the purpose of
allowing the dog to sniff for the presence of drugs within the home.
For about a minute or two," the dog tracked back and forth,
"energetically exploring the area for the strongest point source of
[the] odor [of drugs]."62 The dog indicated that the strongest odor of
drugs was coming from the base of the front door. 63  The police
subsequently obtained a search warrant for the defendant's home
based upon the reaction of the drug dog, and the evidence found
upon the execution of that warrant was the subject of the suppression
motion that eventually brought the case before the Supreme Court.6
A five-Justice majority began its analysis by reiterating that a
Fourth Amendment intrusion can occur either by a physical trespass
into an area specified in the Fourth Amendment or by an invasion
into a legitimate expectation of privacy.5  Because the area
immediately surrounding the home that was entered by the police is
considered part of the home for Fourth Amendment purposes,66 a
Fourth Amendment search occurred when the police penetrated the
curtilage of the home.67 Of course, a police officer may "approach the
home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received,
and then (absent invitation to linger longer) leave" because this is the
implied license that every citizen possesses." However, because
"[t]he scope of a license ... is limited not only to a particular area but
also to a specific purpose," "[t]here is no customary invitation" to
58. E.g., United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359, 1367 (2d Cir. 1985); State v. Rabb,
920 So. 2d 1175, 1189-90 (Fla. 2006); State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 181 (Minn. 2007);
State v. Ortiz, 600 N.W.2d 805, 819-20 (Neb. 1999).
59. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
60. Id. at 1412.
61. Id. at 1421 (Alito, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 1412 (majority opinion).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1417.
66. Id. at 1414 (citing Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984)).
67. Id. at 1417-18.
68. Id. at 1415.
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"introduc[e] a trained police dog to explore the area around the home
in hopes of discovering incriminating evidence."6 9
The State, predictably relying upon Place, Jacobsen and Caballes,
argued that the dog sniff did not constitute a search because there is
no legitimate expectation of privacy for illegal drugs.7 o However,
because the "physical[] intru[sion] on Jardines' property to gather
evidence [was] enough to establish that a search occurred," the Court
did not need to decide whether the dog sniff "of Jardines' home
violated his expectation of privacy under Katz.""
While the Court did not decide this issue, seven of the nine
members of the Court were not the least reticent to address the
question. In a concurring opinion, authored by Justice Elena Kagan
and joined by Justices Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor (each of whom
was among the five Justices constituting the Court's majority on the
issue upon which the Jardines case was actually decided), the three
indicated that they would have "happily" 72 and "easily"73 also decided
the case by holding that the dog sniff was a search.74 In the opinion of
these three Court members, that question has "already [been]
resolved" by Kyllo.7 ' Tracking the language of Kyllo, the concurring
Justices would treat the drug dog as a "'device ... not in general
public use' . . . to 'explore details of the home' . . . that [the police]
would not otherwise have discovered without entering the
premises.""
Four dissenting Justices (Samuel Alito, John Roberts, Anthony
Kennedy, and Stephen Breyer) quarreled primarily with the
majority's holding that the physical intrusion onto the defendant's
property was outside of the scope of the customary implied license to
approach the front door of the home of another.77 They also disputed
the concurring Justices' opinion on the dog sniff question. In their
view, that the drugs sensed by the dog are located in a home rather
than in a motor vehicle does not alter the conclusion that there is no
69. Id. at 1416.
70. Id. at 1417.
71. Id. at 1417-18.
72. Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1418-19.
75. Id. at 1419.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1424 (Alito, J., dissenting).
369Winter 20141 RIGHT TO CRIMINAL PRIVACY
reasonable expectation of privacy for exclusively illegal items.78 They
pointed out that, as the Court previously stated in Caballes,79 Kyllo's
thermal imaging device is an inappropriate analogue to a drug dog.'
Unfortunately, rather than developing this distinction by focusing
upon the fact that a thermal imaging device, unlike a drug dog, can
expose information about legal behavior, Justice Alito's opinion
addresses the unhelpful questions of whether a dog's sense of smell is
legally distinguishable from a human's sense of smell,81 whether a
drug dog is "technology,"" and whether "use of dogs' acute sense of
smell in law enforcement" is "new" or "dates back many centuries." 83
II. Discussion
There can be no dispute that, in the furtherance of Fourth
Amendment values, physical evidence of criminal conduct is often
shielded from detection. However, it does not follow from this that
the privacy of such evidence is itself an axiomatic principle of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. As will be demonstrated, the protection
of criminal evidence is actually a collateral consequence, and not an
objective, of the Fourth Amendment.
At the heart of the debate about dog sniffs, and similar actual or
foreseeable techniques, is the fundamental question of whether the
concealment of evidence of criminal conduct is a goal of the Fourth
Amendment. Certainly, proponents of the PlacelJacobsenlCaballes
line of reasoning have concluded that dog sniffs and the like fall
outside the scope of Fourth Amendment intrusions precisely because
they threaten only the detection of criminal evidence, and the Fourth
Amendment is simply not designed to protect the privacy of such
evidence per se."
Less obvious, perhaps, but equally certain, is that the opponents
of the Place/Jacobsen/Caballes analysis have started with the precept
78. Id. at 1425.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1421.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 408-09 (2005); United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 122-23 (1984); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983).
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that the Fourth Amendment legitimizes the expectation of privacy in
criminal evidence." As one commentator has pronounced:
I may not have the right to commit a crime, but I do
have the right to keep criminal evidence in my home a
secret. The government may not invade my home in
the search of contraband, because it would negate an
important aspect of what it means for that home to be
my private space.'
That statement, at face value, is patently false. If the police were
to arrive tomorrow at one's door carrying a search warrant for the
home, it would become immediately apparent that the government
may, indeed, "invade [the] home in the search of contraband." It
might also become obvious, shortly thereafter, that one does not
"have the right to keep criminal evidence in [the] home a secret."
Of course, all of us are well aware of this. So, hyperbole aside,
the quoted passage must be at least downsized to the proposition that
we "have the right to keep criminal evidence in [our] home[s] a
secret" unless the police have probable cause that this is precisely
what we are doing," and "the government may not invade [our]
home[s] in the search of contraband" unless the police have probable
cause that this is precisely what will be found.
Having, in the interest of accuracy, qualified the claimed right to
"keep criminal evidence in [our] home[s] a secret," the question that
must be asked is whether it makes any sense to understand this as a
"right" at all. How can one be said to enjoy a right to anything if, as
soon as the state has good reason to believe that the citizen might be
85. When Justices Brennan and Marshall objected to the majority's "focus on the
nature of the information or item sought... rather than on the context in which the
information or item is concealed," they verbalized their position that even evidence of
criminal conduct is protected in certain contexts. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 137 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). Moreover, when Justices Kagan, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor concluded that a
dog sniff of a home is a search because it reveals information not otherwise discoverable
without entering the home, they necessarily concluded that no exception to this legitimate
expectation of privacy exists for exclusively criminal evidence. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S.
Ct. 1409, 1419 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring).
86. Aya Gruber, Garbage Pails and Puppy Dog Tails: Is That What Katz Is Made
Of, 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 781, 826-27 (2008).
87. Often a search of a home also requires the acquisition of a search warrant as well.
However, this increases neither the nature nor the quantum of evidence the police must
have in order to search; it merely adjusts the arbiter of probable cause from a law
enforcement officer to a judicial officer.
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exercising that right, the state can immediately put a stop to it?
Would anyone sensibly understand that a citizen enjoys a right to
vote if, upon a showing of probable cause that the citizen is seeking to
exercise that right, the state could lawfully prevent the citizen from
voting? Similarly, how can one justifiably understand the Fourth
Amendment as endorsing a right to privacy in concealing criminal
evidence when it abandons that endorsement as soon as there is
probable cause to believe that a person is exercising this supposed
right?
The point can be further demonstrated by a comparison with the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In relevant
part, the Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person... shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."" This
is truly a right. It is a right to be free from compelled self-
incrimination. To paraphrase the comment cited earlier,89 I may not
have the right to commit a crime, but I do have the right to keep
criminal evidence in my thoughts a secret.
Nowhere in the text or the judicial construction of this right is
there even a suggestion that compelled self-incrimination will be
allowed if, for example, there exists probable cause that the individual
possesses self-incriminating information. As such, the Fifth
Amendment privilege manifests a value judgment that compelled
self-incrimination is intolerable. The right is a right to be free from
an objectionable process. Plainly, the right is not reserved for the
innocent, and it is not designed only to permit us to keep to ourselves
our innocent secrets."
The designers of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination undoubtedly sought to outlaw compelled self-
incrimination, as no allowance is made in the Fifth Amendment for a
government interest sufficiently weighty to override the privilege.
The Fourth Amendment, by contrast, presents no such categorical
condemnation of the process it regulates. Compelled, testimonial
self-incrimination may be absolutely proscribed, but searches do not
suffer the same censure. Searches are routinely permitted, albeit with
some prerequisites. This is no accident. The Framers could easily
have created an absolute right of privacy, say, for example, in the
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
89. Gruber, supra note 86, at 826-27.
90. See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951). In fact, because a
precondition for the privilege is that the compelled testimony be incriminating, the
innocent are far less likely to have occasion to invoke the right than are the guilty.
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home, by disallowing penetration of the home even with a warrant.
This, however, they conspicuously chose not to do. There can be no
doubt that the drafters of the Fourth Amendment intended to allow
searches, even in the most private of locations.
Well, then, since it is manifest that the Framers did not intend to
cloak physical evidence with the same immunity granted to a
suspect's thoughts, the question remains: Which endeavors to
discover physical evidence did the Framers think desirable and which
did they find objectionable? It will not suffice to say that searches
conducted with probable cause and a warrant are the goal of the
Fourth Amendment. No one wishes to have his home searched
pursuant to a warrant based upon probable cause. The requirement
of probable cause is a means to an end, not an end in and of itself.
The requirement of probable cause should function as a proxy for
approximating, often on the basis of uncertain information, the
distinction between undesirable and desirable intrusions.
So the question could be reformulated as follows: in a perfect
world, which intrusions would we allow and which would we
prohibit? More importantly, what answers to these questions are to
be derived from the Fourth Amendment itself? Given the relatively
qualified restrictions placed upon searches by the Fourth
Amendment, it is neither persuasive nor satisfying to suggest, as some
have done,9' that the Fourth Amendment was intended to protect the
places searched and that therefore the legality of the items sought is
irrelevant.
By way of illustration, imagine two individuals: A and B. Each
of A and B have within their homes a shoebox containing very private
letters. In the case of A, these letters are correspondence between A
and his lover containing no evidence of criminal conduct, past,
present or future. In the case of B, these letters are communications
between B and his lover planning and recounting a bank robbery
committed by the two correspondents. Imagine further that the
police have solid information as to the actual content of the letters of
each of A and B, as well as probable cause to believe, in each case,
that the letters are located in a shoebox on the floor of the closet of
the master bedroom of the home. If the police were to apply for
search warrants to enter the homes of A and B to recover the
respective sets of letters, a warrant would be issued for B's home, but
not for the home of A.
91. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 137 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Swanson, supra note 50, at 150; Hunt, supra note 49, at 298.
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This disparate result would occur notwithstanding the parallel
search locations. The only distinguishing factor, and one that is
dispositive on the issuance of the warrant, is that the items sought
from B's home are evidence of criminal behavior while the items
sought from A's home are not. At the very least, this illustrates that
the criminal nature of the items sought is absolutely relevant to, and
indeed sometimes dispositive of, the resolution of the Fourth
Amendment issue. Indeed, in a perfect world, we would hope to
allow all searches that produce criminal evidence and proscribe all
searches that do not.2 However, in the imperfect, but real, world in
which the Fourth Amendment must operate, we permit intrusions
based upon the probability of discovering criminal evidence.
In other words, given the necessary uncertainties when operating
prospectively, we allow a warrant to search B's home because of the
reasonable chance of discovering criminal evidence. The hurdle of
probable cause is not erected because we wish to legitimize B's
privacy in his bank robbery correspondence; that requirement is
imposed because the Fourth Amendment limits the allowable risks of
discovering truly innocent, albeit private, items. That is why, as in the
case of A, if the intrusion is to seize truly noncriminal evidence-
items that are neither contraband nor of any evidentiary
significance-no amount of probable cause will be sufficient to permit
the intrusion.
Some might attempt to retreat without surrendering by arguing
that a person does have a legitimate expectation of privacy in criminal
evidence, albeit a much reduced right that is more easily outweighed
by the state's interest in combating crime. However, if this were so,
how could one ever hope to balance the respective interests of the
citizen and the state in applying the Fourth Amendment to individual
cases? How can one hope to assign relative weights to two competing
interests if those interests are one and the same? More particularly, if
the state has a legitimate interest in discovering criminal evidence,
and the individual has a legitimate interest in concealing the same
evidence, how can one hope to balance these interests? Unless one is
willing to say that categorically, one of these interests always trumps
the other-the consequence of which would be that the losing interest
92. Arnold H. Loewy, The Fourth Amendment as a Device for Protecting the
Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1244 (1983).
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has no legitimacy under the Fourth Amendment-how does one
weigh the respective interests? 3
Consider further the impact of probable cause. The greater the
probability that criminal evidence is located in the place to be
searched, the greater the likelihood that the search will be permitted
under the Fourth Amendment. However, if the individual truly has a
legitimate expectation of privacy in concealing criminal evidence, why
does the individual's interest in privacy move inversely to the
probability that the object of that privacy interest exists? In concrete
terms, if I truly have a "right to keep criminal evidence in my home a
secret," 94 why does that right disappear in direct proportion to the
increased probability that I actually have the criminal evidence in my
home? The only sensible explanation is that I do not have any such
"right to keep criminal evidence in my home a secret,"95 and the
probability that the evidence exists in the targeted location only
affects the state's interest in discovering such evidence.
All of this leads to one conclusion: The Fourth Amendment does
not, at its core, recognize as legitimate or reasonable any right to
conceal evidence of a crime." This does not mean that only the
innocent are entitled to Fourth Amendment protection. Nor does
this mean that all successful efforts to discover criminal evidence are
not "searches" and therefore need not comply with Fourth
Amendment restrictions. This is so for two reasons.97
First, it is often the case that criminal evidence cannot be
discovered or seized without also intruding upon legitimate
expectations of privacy.98 By way of illustration, recall the example of
B, the individual who keeps criminally conspiratorial letters in a
shoebox in his home. While there is nothing to support the notion
that B's privacy in such conspiratorial letters is of any value
93. If, as I suggest, the individual's only legitimate interest is in noncriminal evidence,
then no such problem exists. The state's interest in discovering criminal evidence and the
individual's interest in preserving privacy for noncriminal items are now distinct and can
be assigned different weights depending on the circumstances of the individual case.
94. Gruber, supra note 86, at 826-27.
95. See id.
96. Ric Simmons, From Katz to Kyllo: A Blueprint for Adapting the Fourth
Amendment to Twenty-First Century Technologies, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 1303, 1349 (2002);
Loewy, supra note 92, at 1230.
97. I suspect that the failure to recognize this has led to some overzealous insistence
that the Fourth Amendment recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy for criminal
evidence.
98. Simmons, supra note 2, at 413.
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whatsoever under the Fourth Amendment, it is impossible to discover
and seize these letters without entering B's home and thereby
intruding upon the myriad noncriminal items and information in B's
home as to which B unquestionably enjoys a legitimate expectation of
privacy. The only way to insure B's reasonable expectation of privacy
for the noncriminal possessions in his home is to extend the Fourth
Amendment restrictions to all searches of his home, regardless of the
goal of the search. In that respect, B enjoys Fourth Amendment
protection for his criminal letters as an incidental benefit to our
constitutional commitment to protect his reasonable expectation of
privacy for his noncriminal possessions.9
Second, ordinarily, one cannot know that the target of the search
is, in fact, criminal evidence unless and until the search is completed.
By then, of course, the risk that the object of the search is entirely
innocent will, in some cases, have been realized. Legitimate Fourth
Amendment values will have been compromised. Operating
prospectively, the Fourth Amendment attempts to minimize this risk
by requiring a showing of probable cause-or some alternative.
Probable cause is, in essence, an endeavor to predict the likelihood of
"success"-measured by the recovery of criminal evidence and the
reduction of circumstances in which noncriminal items are exposed.
The requirement of probable cause certainly does not arise from an
undertaking to protect the privacy of criminal ventures. If that were
the goal, there would be no rational correlation between the presence
of probable cause and the constitutional legitimacy of the search.
Although the Court has perhaps not been as meticulous as one
might hope in explaining itself, I do believe this is what the Court has
had in mind when it has characterized dog sniffs as "sui generis."'co
The illegal drugs detected by the drug dogs are contraband and do
not merit any consideration in and of themselves under the Fourth
Amendment. Moreover, the process of dog sniffs involves none of
the risks of ordinary searches and, therefore, under the Fourth
Amendment, there is no reason to treat these as Fourth Amendment
intrusions in order to protect legitimate privacy.
Assuming that the time.o. and place 02 of the dog sniff involves no
Fourth Amendment transgressions, the sniff itself does not constitute
99. Loewy, supra note 92, at 1230.
100. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696,
707 (1983).
101. In other words, the item to be sniffed has not been seized or detained for an
impermissible amount of time. See Place, 462 U.S. at 709-10.
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a "search" under the Fourth Amendment. The drug dog simply
indicates "a yes or a no"'o3 to the question of the presence of illegal
drugs, and "neither answer implicates any legitimate expectation of
privacy. ""m Moreover, because the drug dog cannot convey any other
information, drug sniffs create no risk of intruding upon legitimately
private matters.
Finally, unlike true searches, the fact that dog sniffs will not
disclose legitimate private matters is not something we know with
certainty only after the search is consummated. A dog sniff is
"defined not by what [it] actually detects, but rather what it is able to
detect.""' To the extent that the Fourth Amendment requires
probable cause in order to filter out searches that present too high a
risk of revealing only innocent, private matters, why would we need
to screen procedures such as dog sniffs, that, even measured
prospectively, present no possibility whatsoever of revealing
innocent, private matters?
On this last point, some have argued that it depends on the
assumption that drug dogs are flawlessly accurate, an assumption that
is arguably unjustified.'" That objection, however, is entirely
misdirected. The fallibility of dog sniffs is irrelevant to the issue of
whether dog sniffs are Fourth Amendment searches.
Consider this hypothetical scenario. Suppose an individual
shows up at a local police station and informs the police that he is a
clairvoyant with the unique ability to detect, from a public street, the
presence of stolen property located within a home without the
necessity of visually observing the interior of the targeted property.
Suppose further that the self-proclaimed psychic claims no ability
whatsoever to identify any contents other than stolen property, and
therefore, like the drug dog, cannot invade any legitimate expectation
of privacy. The police employ the individual, and, after a time, he
identifies several homes as containing items stolen during recent
burglaries. At that point, no search has taken place for all of the
reasons explained earlier.
102. In other words, the location of the dog to accomplish the sniff is not itself an
impermissible Fourth Amendment search. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
103. Simmons, supra note 96, at 1354.
104. Id.
105. Simmons, supra note 2, at 432.
106. This point was the focus of Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 410-17 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting), and has been echoed by
some commentators, e.g., Hunt, supra note 49, at 316.
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Now suppose-advancing Justice Souter's objection to its
strongest possible factual scenario-that the "clairvoyant" is a fraud,
that he possesses none of his claimed abilities, and that none of the
homes identified by him actually contain any stolen property
whatsoever. Does this additional fact convert the procedure used by
the individual into a search? It does not, and that is because, first, the
nature of the information revealed remains the same whether the
perception is accurate or not, and second, the clairvoyant, like the
drug dog, reveals no information about legitimately private matters.
Consequently, the proper characterization of the dog sniff as
something other than a search under the Fourth Amendment is
completely unaffected by the possibility of false positives from the
drug dogs.
Of course, there could be an actual Fourth Amendment search
subsequent to a positive result from a dog sniff. If a drug dog alerts to
the presence of illegal drugs in a home from a position that is not
itself a physical trespass onto a protected area,07 one should expect
the police to then seek to obtain a search warrant for the home. If the
drug dog was inaccurate, then when the warrant is issued, the result
will be a search that is at the heart of what the Fourth Amendment
was designed, to the extent reasonably possible, to prevent. The
residents will have had their legitimate privacy compromised and,
with the benefits of hindsight, for no good reason.
Nevertheless, the Fourth Amendment "search" in this scenario
takes place when the police enter the home with a search warrant, not
earlier when the drug dog sniffs the home from the street. An event
that is not a search is not magically transformed into a search merely
because it eventually yields information that leads to a search. If that
were the case, then every observation made by a police officer in a
public area would have to be reclassified as a search whenever the
observations did lead, or perhaps merely because they could lead, to
the issuance of a search warrant.
If drug dogs are insufficiently reliable, then that information
would be extremely relevant to whether dog sniff results constitute
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant. One
commentator has suggested that more than probable cause should be
required to conduct a search based upon the results of a dog sniff or
107. For example, suppose a drug dog, from a public street, is able to alert to drugs
within a home, thereby avoiding an unlicensed entry into the curtilage of the home that
was fatal to the state's position in Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
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some similar process." Whether that would be a good idea, and
whether that could be accomplished short of a constitutional
amendment, are interesting questions separate from, and beyond the
scope of, the one issue addressed in this Article.
The simple truth is that dog sniffs, and any other real or
hypothetical techniques that can disclose nothing more than the
presence or absence of criminal activities, are not searches under the
Fourth Amendment. It is clear from the operation of the
Amendment that it was never designed with the ambition of
insulating criminal activity from detection. In practice, the
concealment of criminal behavior is often made possible by the
Fourth Amendment, but only as a collateral cost of protecting our
privacy for noncriminal matters. When a technique exists for
exposing criminal evidence without any risk whatsoever of exposing
legitimately private matters, the use of that technique is entirely
consistent with Fourth Amendment values and concerns that
constitutional freedoms are being eroded are "misplaced."o,
It is perhaps unfortunate that this issue arises, at least thus far,
solely in connection with the possession of illegal drugs. There is
certainly a serious view that questions the wisdom, and sometimes
even the propriety, of criminalizing the possession of such drugs. One
possible consequence of this might be that our ambivalence about
criminalizing drug possession fuels our resistance to the prospect of
drug dogs sniffing for drugs and distorts our analysis of the purely
legal question of whether techniques that can detect only the
presence or absence of criminal activities, and nothing more, intrude
upon Fourth Amendment values.
In an effort to isolate this question, consider one last
hypothetical scenario. Suppose that dogs could be trained, or
technology created, to detect solely the presence or absence of sexual
molestation of children, and nothing else. I suppose it is a matter of
opinion whether, in the cause of civil liberties, one would want to
place restrictions upon the use of such animals or machines to protect
the privacy of the child molesters. What should not be a matter of
opinion is that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment did no such
thing.
108. Simmons, supra note 2, at 458-59.
109. Simmons, supra note 96, at 1357.
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